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It has long been believed that the establishment of the free 
banking laws was a move by state legislatures to provide greater 
access to the bank market and to increase bank competition. Kenneth 
Ng (1988) challenged the legislative approval system of bank 
chartering enhanced competition. Ng point outs that in states that 
enacted free banking laws, such as Massachusetts, Vermont, Georgia, 
Alabama, and Florida, few free banks actually entered after the 
introduction of the free banking laws. This inactivity suggests 
that some of the provisions of the new laws may have precluded 
easier entry. In addition to those free banking stats that showed 
little free banking, Ng finds the relative growth rates of the bank 
assets in free banking states were not significantly different from 
those of the region or the nation. He concludes that "the absence 
of unusual growth in free banking states suggests that free banking 
laws exchange one set of barriers contained in the legislative 
charter system for a different, but equally effective barriers." 1 
The use of the relative growth rates, however, does not 
necessarily show a change in barriers to entry for two crucial 
reasons. First, the use of the relative growth rates of bank assets 
to estimate entry fails to distinguish between barriers to new entry 
and barriers to scale economies. A banking system's assets could 
increase without new entry if all banks in the system increased 
financial leverage or if the existing banks increased the level of 
retain earnings. In the short run, chartering states could have 
competed with the free banking states while still having significant 
barriers to 
1 Ng (1989, p. 887) Ng also suggests that the chartering systems had 
sufficient entry ports by non-charter private banks such that the 
market was competitive prior the enactment of the free banking laws. 
(p.888) 
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entry a nd barrier s to scale economies . A banking s y stem's assets 
coul d increase without n e w e n try i f al l banks in the sys tem 
increased fi nancial l everage or if t h e existing banks increase d 
t he level of re tained earnings. In the s hort run, chartering 
stat es could have competed with t h e free banking s tate s whil e 
still having significant barriers to new e n try if the ir growth 
r a tes were att ributed t o scale economies. Consequently relative 
growth rates in bank assets could be similar in free banking and 
c hartering states. 
Second, as Ng pointed out, t h e enac t ment of the free banking 
laws may h ave had interstate affects . 2 The fre e banking l aws 
ma y h ave induced c hartering states to liberalize thei r c harte ring 
pol icies . Thus, t h e free b a nking l a ws may h a v e induc e d t h e non -
free banking states' legislatures to institute a dif ferent 
c har t ering p o l icy de s igned t o increase t h e number of chart.e rs. 3 
This p aper reexamines t he i mpact of the free banking l a ws on 
barriers to e n try in both c harte r and free banking states before 
a nd after enac t ment. We include the a n a l y s i s t h e effects of 
economies of scale on e n try a nd t h e c h a nge in c hartering policie s 
2 Ng (1 989) footno t e 18, page 888. 
3 Bodenhorn (1990) examines the e n try issue t h rough 
interfirm rivalry and concluded t h a t t:t.te free banking l a ws had a 
.. 
positive affect on competition through the 11 i ncreasing possibility 
of e n t ry and the number of potential e nt rants . .. 11 • His study 
examined six city markets. Our study takes a st ronge r posi t i on 
that free banking laws actually lowered barriers to entry. 
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of c hartering s tates. In the next sec t ion, a brief r e view of 
ent ry policy a nd activity is given . In Section I II, a 
competitive model o f bank e nt r y is presented . In Se ction IV, a 
description of the data and the estimation p rocedures for cros s -
s ectional - time serie s da t a a r e give n. In Sections v a nd VI we 
test capital formation a nd bank entry, repec t ive ly , to examine 
difference s in ent ry be tween a l ternative state bank i ng syste ms. 
II) Banking Entry During the Antebellum Period 
During t h e first part of the 19 t h century, s t ate charters we r e 
indi vidually con structed and issued by t h e s tate l egislatures . 
In 18 28 the New York State l egislature e nacte d a g e n e ral banking 
l a w t hat s e t uniform regulat ions for all banks that received 
legi s lative approval . This legislative approval was abandoned in 
1838 with t h e e nac t me n t of a free banking law. Th e free 
banki ng r e forms appear to have come in two distinct wave s : 18 3 7 -
1845 and 18 5 0 - 185 3 . In the first wave , four s tate s e n a cted some 
fo rm of free banking legi s l at ion: Michigan, Ne w York, Georgia, 
and Ohio. Be tween 1850 and 1853, el e v e n more s tate s e nacted 
f r ee banking laws and, by 1860, seventeen of t we nty - seve n 
a n tebe l lum state s followed New York's lead by e limina ting 
legi slative approval and e nacting free banking l a ws . The free 
k~~nking l a ws, however, did not:. prec l ude t h e leg·islatures from 
issuing c harte r s . In fact , ma ny o f t h e free banking states 
continued t o issue charters, t hus establishing a dual b anking 
s y stem. 
On e would expect that if the banking r e f o rm reduced barriers 
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to e ntry, t h e evidence would show an increase in new entrants in 
free banking s tates and littl e change in new entry in the 
chartering stat es , assuming no interstate effects. 4 A summary 
of the antebellum states entry act i vity is provided in Table 1. 
From Table 1, it appears t hat i n most regions, regardless of t h e 
type of banking system, entry increased after t h e e nactment of 
the free banking l a w, or in the c hartering states ' case, after 
1851; only the free banking states of Ne w England s howed a 
slowdown in the growth of n e w e ntrants . 5 
Several c har t ering stat es appeared to h ave made s fi cant 
c hanges in chartering policy af t er 1851 . The Ne w England 
c hartering states increased n e w banks by 44% between 1851 and 
1854 whereas t hree yea rs prior to 1851 t hese same state s only 
i ncrease the number of banks by 7% . In Virgina, 23 n e w bank s 
e n tered the market after 1851. A Mi nority Report from the 
4 Sylla (198 5 ) suggests t hat the chartering policies of the 
New England Sates were d e fac to free banking states. Thus, the 
enactment of a free banking law would have shown little effect . 
5 The summary of entry activity includes banks that offically 
e ntered u nder t h e free banking law. Ng and o t hers have contended 
that a defect i n t h e laws of New Jeresy and Indiana produced t h e 
sponsible entry of "wildcat bankers 11 and thert=; fore, should not 
be included in the a nalysis. However, in both states the bank 
supervisors found that in most ca.ses t here was full compilance with 
the law. (Banker's Maga zine, 1855, p. 658 & Indiana, 1856 ) 
Committee on Banks observed that 
11 t he independent banks chartered in Virginia during 
the l ast t h.ree years closely resemble those banks 
which, in New York and other northern states, have been 
established under what is called the fre e banking 
system . .. they seem to have been conferred, whe never 
asked for , as a matter of course, and wi t hout contest . 
They have been granted, indeed with such faci lity, t hat 
if a general law, containing similar provision, had 
been enacted three years ago, t he result would in no 
way differ . .. " 6 
In t h e south, South Carolina issued 6 n e w charters during the 
three - year window (a 42% increase ) , but this is all t hey allowed 
up to 1860 . Kentucky and Nor t h Carolina both showed modest 
increases between 1851 and 1854, but showed significa nt entry 
thereafter; the number of banks in Kentucky more t r1an doubled 
whereas North Carolina had over a 50% increase in charters. 
Althou gh Table 1 indicates that entry activity increased 
across mos t states , i t is not clear whether t h e free banking 
states were better able to accommodate the d e mand for banking 
capital and facilit s than the chartering states . A 
reexamination of the period usi ng a bank entry mode l is 
informative. 
III. Bank Entry Model 
Capital formation in the banking marke t can come from two 
sources, internally generated capital from existing banks or 
6 Virginia House of Dele~;iates Minority :Report from the 
Committee on Banks, 1853 ·-54, Document No. 60, page 4 . 
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externally generated capital from new e n tran ts . For t hose 
operating under a free banking system, there were no restrictions 
on either source of entry, except t h e requirement that all new 
entrants maintain a minimum capital level . In t h e non·- free 
banking states bot h sources of entry were regulated. 
Legislatures restricte d c harters a nd t hose t hat received charters 
were required to operate wi t hin a r ansJe of capital level s or at a 
specif ic capital level. Charter b a nks at the uppe r end of their 
regulatory capital requirements would h ave to seek legislative 
approval for any increase . To evaluate t hese l egislative 
barriers , we develop a c ompetitiv e model of capital formation and 
net e n try. Th e focus of t h is section is to develop a capital 
formation model and a model t hat examines n e w bank e n try. 
Capital Formation 
Pelt zman (196 5,19 70), Throop (197 5 ) and Dwyer (198 1 ) have 
examined the impact of regulation on b a nk e n try a nd capital 
formation. Their models applied the Friedman (1 962 ) model of 
capi t al formation over time a nd provide the basis for our 
modeling of capital formation within a state. 
The desired stoc k supply of b a nki ng ca~ital of the jth state 
in period t , ( C"* jt) , is a fun ct i on of the r ate of return to 
banking (Rbit), the return on alternative investment opportunit 
(R'\t ) , and the failure rate in banking ( FRjt) : 7 
c• ..., 
Dwyer includes the level of bank capi tal relat i ve to 
alternative e mployme n ts, a nd the rate of re turn on commodit s in 
his model . Data for these variables were not available and were 
7 
FRit'), (1) 
where t he expected sign of the partial derivative i s given above 
each variable. 
The desired stock s upply of capital varies directly wi th the 
rate of return in banking, and vari es inverse ly with the rate of 
return on a l te rnative fi nancial investment opportuni t ies. 
Dwyer, as well as Peltzrnan, argue s that failures s hould h ave a 
negative impact on bank capital formation. Two reasons are given 
for t he negat i v e relation s hip: 11 first a h iqh fa ilure rate of 
existing banks should reflect market conditions making failure 
more probable for cu rren tly e s tblished (or establishing) 
institutions; second, t he tende ncy of bank f a i l ures to cause a 
'run' on existing institutions is stronger the more general are 
bank fail u res . ire Bot h cond i t ion s would i ndicate a n increase in 
risk to entrep reneurs current ly in banking (and to those who plan 
to e n te r) and a decrease in t h e willingness to supply capital to 
t h e market. 
The desired stock demand for bank capital , 
depe nds inversely on the bank's cos t of 
directly on t h e level of deposits and banknotes (net of specie) 
and on regional banknot es a nd deposits (DR11:l : 
+ + 
f (Rbjt• Dju DRjt) ( 2) 
not included in the model. 
B Peltzman (1965 , p . 32 ) 
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Capital is an input for the production of assets . As the 
cost of bank capital declines, the bank wil l d emand more capital 
to fi n a nce their assets . In t he abse nce of federa l depos 
insurance, bank depositors demand bank capital as a cushion 
a gainst possible loss . 9 As b a nk de posi ts grow , depositors 
demand additional capital and banks desire more capital so as to 
satisfy their depositors. Likewise, the demand for capital coul d 
be influence d by the actions of other states . We would expect 
that an increase in regional money supply (deposits and 
banknotes) would have a t wo - fold effect on t he demand for ''in -
state " bank capital . As regional money supply increases relative 
to t he money supply of a particular s t ate , there is an increased 
l ike lihood of 11 foreign" currency circulating a nd competiW:J with 
in - s t ate currency. Individual s holding foreign currency 
suggests that either the in-state banking system can not meet the 
state's dema nd for currency or the in - state currency i s riskier 
t han the foreign currency. 10 In order to compete with foreign 
9 Since bank creditors are concern about potential l os ses , 
the appropriate measure of risk of loss would be the bank 
liabilities less specie. 
10 Foreign currency was banknotes circulating within one state 
that were i ssu ed by a bank from another state. In general, foreign 
.,., 
banknot es circulated at a di scount . Gordon (1991) found that t his 
discount reflected the transaction cost s of r e turning the banknote 
to t h e issuing bank and a slight risk premium. If neighboring 
states allowe d their money supply to increase by increasing the 
9 
currency, i n - state bankers would demand bank capital for the 
purpose of r easing currency circulation or reducing the 
relat ive risk. Thus, regional deposits wou ld have a positive 
effect on in - state capital if the in - state sys t em could not mee t 
in ·- s t a t e demand. 
Equating equ ation (2) to (1) a nd solving for the desired 
s t ock e qui l i b riwn leve l of capital yield s t h e fo l lowing redu ced 
form equation:. 
+ + 
C*jt = h (Dj ti DRit• Rajt• FRitJ ( 3 ) 
Entry of capital wi t h in a state occurs when the actual stock 
of capital deviates from t h e desired stock of capital . Thus , the 
actual rate of c h a nge of capital per unit of t ime for state j is 
l nCjt - lnCjt -i = L(lnC*jt ···· lnCjt-1 ), (4 ) 
where l n C'Jt denotes t h e l ogari t r1m of t he desired flrn...r for bank 
c apital and L denotes t h e coefficient of adjustment. Assuming 
state's banking capital, we woul d expect t hat t h e s k pre mium on 
foreign banknotes would remain constant . The increase in fore ign 
banknote s coul d be redeemed by - state bank s as long as they had 
a dequate supply of capital t o back t h e new issue. If t here was a 
s hortage of capital , in-s tate banks could increase the discount 
rate whi c h would i n c r ease the circu l at ion o f foreign banknotes . 
._, 
Thus, e v en when we con s ider the adj ustme nt in discoun t rates, we 
would expect in - states banlcs to d e ma nd more banking capital as 
foreign currency increases . 
10 
the desired flow of capital equals the ac tual flow and 
sub sti t uting equ a t ion (3 ) i n t o equ a tion (4) , 
For t his study , we are also con ce r ned with the entry of new 
banks wi t hin a state. 11 By defini tion, ban k capital per bank 
for t he jth state in time period t (Sjt ) is equal to total 
capital (Cj1J divided by t:h.e total number of banks (Bjt ) : 
Th e rate of change in the number o:E banks can be found by 
differe ntiating equation (6) with respect to time, 
dB· = 
·- J 
dt 
dC -
- J 
Cit: -i d.t C' ';:) jt·· l 
dS :J 
dt 
( 6) 
( 7) 
By defini tion, t r1e r ate of change in the nurnber of banks l' C:' ,, equal 
to t he rate of net entry (NER) 
dBi = NERjt = E:J t -· Mjt ( 7 f ) 
Bjt-l dt:. 
where E is the entry rate, M is the me rger rate, and X is the 
exit rate. 12 Thus, equat ion (7) states that the net e n t ry rate 
i n the market will increase with the percentage increase 
capital, holding average capital size constant, and will decrease 
a s banks in the market increase capital stock. Subs tituting 
11 The foll owing section follows the l ead of Peltzman (1965) . 
12 During the antebellum period mergers were rarely occured . 
The historical record is silient on merge r activity. One reason 
could be t hat most banking states only allowed u ni t b ranch banking 
and merging would be unlikely option . 
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equation (5 ) into (7), we find that net entry rate i s equal to 
NEjt = T...1 [l1. (lnDjt1 l nDRju lnRajt• lnFl~ jt) - lnCjt-1 ] dSj + E13 .(8) 
SJt - 1 
Thus , t h e model predicts that net e n try is a positive function of 
deposi ts, r egion a l deposits, and inverse l y rel ate d to the rate of 
r e turn on alternat i ve i nvestme nt s , the fa i lure rate in the 
banking market, lagged capi tal , and t h e growth 
bank . 
IV. Data and. Estimation Techniques 
capi tal per 
Equations ( 5) and ( 8) p rovide t he bc::i.s is of t he empirical 
analysis. Bank data were compiled from t h e various s t a t e bank 
c ondition. r e ports. 14 From t h e condition report.s , entry and 
exi t data were cal cu lated . In some cases , individual banks that 
had reported in the pas t were not listed on t h e bank condit i on 
report for a particular year a nd the n s howed up on the repor t t h e 
following y ear. Since t h e b a nk continued in operation during the 
period , the condition report was adjusted to reflect its 
ope rations . 
Whe n non - reporting b a nks were found, adjustments were made 
to the tot.al number of banks ope rating, total bank cap i t al , 
deposi t s a nd banknotes. It was assumed that t h e bank's capital 
,,. 
13 Since the change i n capital is a stochastic variabl e , t h e 
subs titution of equation (5) into (5') transfonns a definitional 
r e lationship into a behavioral a nd stochas tic relation s hip. 
11 Data was tak:en from the 1876 Repor t of the Comptroller of 
Currency publ ished and t h e individual state b ank condition reports . 
12 
equaled last period's capital stock a nd that deposits and 
banknotes were issued at a rate equal to the industry averages of 
t he deposit - capital a nd banknote-capi tal ratios. These banks 
were not considered as exiting banks when they did not report nor 
as entran ts when they reported t he following year. 
,Some states allowed branch banking , other states unit branch 
banking. For purposes of comparison across states , each branch 
in branch -banking states was considered as an individual bank. 
If a bank closed (or opened ) a branch, it was coun ted as an exit 
(or new ent rant) . 
Twenty -two states were examined in this study. The states 
wece selec ted for the completeness of their data series from 1844 
to 1860 . (See Table 2.) Thirteen states had a free banking l aw 
at some point during the period. Three of these t hirteen states, 
New York, Illinois, and Wi scon sin, never chartered banks during 
t he observed period . 
Railroad stocks quoted at the Boston Stock Market were used 
as the return on alternative investments (It is assumed that 
these returns reflect alternative returns in each state. ) ,Joseph 
G. Martin ( 1862 ) , Commission Stock. Broker, compiled dividend and 
stock price information on Boston banks, railroads, manufacturing 
and insurance companies fcom 1835 to 1862. From this data, the 
a~verage dividend yield (Rat) was calculated by divid i ng the 
average dividend payment of the railroads operating in the period 
by t he average share price . The average share price (P0 1: ) of the 
portfolio was calculated by averaging the yearly averages of each 
L3 
stock . (Yearly averages were found by taking t h e average of the 
h igh and l ow p rice for the year. ) We def 
.RR. = RRt = R<lt + P" ;·1::i" 
. )t . t .. t · l . 
We assume that t h e t otal re turns to rai lroad stock is a p roxy for 
all s tate s . In a dd i t ion, for each s t ate the regional d eposit 
variable was calcula t e d by summing th.e level of banknotes and 
deposits of c on tigu ou s states . 
When us i ng h istorical data, insufficient sampl e size s often 
pre clude econometric testing . Given a sample of t w·enty - two 
s tat es wi t h observations ranging from ten to seventeen, we are 
able to overcome t his obstacle a nd e nj oy advantages associated 
wi t h panel da t a . The increa sed efficiency due to greater degrees 
of freedom do no t , h owever, come wi t hou t a cost . The econometri c 
difficul ties inh e rent i n both time s e ries a nd cros s sectional 
data , aut ocorre l a t ion and heterosce dasticity, mu st be addres s ed . 
For each equat ion estimated we use several econometric 
technique s . 1 5 First, we t est for fixed affects across states 
us irv:J dummy variables fo r each state. The least squa r e s dummy 
v a riable model tests whether differences in behavior occur due to 
differences across states. If s o , state dummy varia b l e s a re 
ma intained throughout al l remaining estima t ions. If not , they 
are dropped from the model specification . 
Second, state-wise heteroscedasticity is tested . Using the 
15 We fo l lowe d the techniques use d by Greene (19 9 0) to assess 
a nd correc t fo r hete r oscedast i city and autocorrelation fo r panel 
data . 
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ordinary least squares estimates from t h e Prais - Winston 
t ran sformed data , a Lagr a nge multipl ier stat is t ic is comput ed. A 
significant chi-square indicates heteroscedasticity. Whe n 
present, it requires yet another transformation of the data to 
rid the system of heteroscedast i city . 
V. Bank Capital l.\dj ustrnent 
The general model estimated comes from t h e reduced form 
equation for capital given by (5 ) : 
LilnCJt. 
16 
+ /.J•j t .• 
We included dummy variables to capture the long - run and s hort -run 
effects of t h e free bank ing laws over time: TI ME , TIME3Y , FREE, 
and FREE3Y. Between 1852 and 1854 eight states enacted free 
banking laws . To examin e the structural changes that may have 
occurred in the Pure Chartering States during this wave of free 
banking legislation, we included a TIME dummy variable which 
takes on the value of a ne af t er 1 851 and i s zero for years up to 
and including 1851. TIME3Y is a dummy vari able taking a value of 
one just for the 1852 - 54 period, and zero otherwise . For states 
that enacted free banking laws we i n c luded a FREE dummy variable 
16 In our sample , we h ad sev eral pe r iods where the failure 
rate was zero. In order to ma intain sample size, we did not log 
the failure rate . 
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which takes on the value of 1 for any y e ar a free banking l aw is 
in effect and zero otherwise . FREE3Y takes on the v alue of one 
only during t he firs t three years of a state's free banking 
period , and ze ro o t herwise which enables us to examine t h e 
initial struc t u ral c hanges caused by e nact ing free banking l a ws. 
Some estimations requi re the use of t h e s tate dummy variables . 
We expec t the signs of t he adjus tment coefficient (L) would 
be different unde r different banking regimes. If a s t a te allows 
capital to f low freely i n to the market, we would expec t bank s to 
be respon siv e to t h e changes in t h e demand for bank capi tal. 
Capital would move rapidly to desire d l evel s , a nd t h e coeff icie n t 
of adjustment (L) woul d be close to one . However , if t here are 
restrictions to t h e f l ow of capital, s u c h as l egislative lags to 
ne w e ntry, or undercapitaliztion of n e w e n trants , t hen t h e 
ad justment proce s s would be muc h slower and t h e coefficien t of 
a djustment woul d be c loser to zero. 17 Likewise , a priori , the 
responsiveness of capital formation to lroad retur:n and 
r egional deposits is expected to be s maller in the r estricted 
entry system . After 1851 or after t h e e nactment of the free 
banking, we would expect a n i ncrease in capital l e vels indicated 
17 Some c harteri ng states , like Virginia , h ad capitial 
r~equireme:nt provisions i n each charter t h a. t re s t ric ited t h e bank to 
a range of capital l evels . Other states , like Massachusetts, set 
the capital level for each bank . Although these restric tions can 
be circumvent e d by increasing reta in earnings, t hey vmuld prohibit 
the bank from r eaching its desired l evel of capital . 
16 
by a positive sign on t h e Time a nd Free dummy variables. 
The states were grouped into three categories : t h e Pure Free 
Banking States (PFBS ) - states that had free banking t h rough out 
the sample period, t h e Pure Chartering States (PCS ) ·- states that 
did not e n ac t free bank i ng l egislation , and the Changeover States 
(CS ) - states t hat e nacted free banking legislation during the 
period . 18 A Chow test indicated t hat we could no t pool t he 
t h ree samples suggesting t h ere were significant structural 
differences between the Pure Chartering States, Changeovers , a nd 
the Pure Free Stat es . 19 Thus , we exami:ne each group for t heir 
whole period . (See Table 3. ) It appears that the model was a b le 
to expl 63% of t h e variation 6lnC in t h e PFBS whi le the model 
was abl e to explain less t h an 43 % and 31% of the v ariation in t h e 
CS and PCS, r espectively. 
In the PFBS, it appears t hat the se states responded more 
quickly to c h a nges in desire d capital t h an either the PCS o r CS. 
A one percent increase in desire d capital re s ulted in a 49% 
increase in ac tual capital, almos t half the desired amount. In 
t h e PCS and t h e CS , t he r espon se was less t h an half of t h e PFBS 
18 Ohio wa.s included i n CS sample since they h a d a. period of 
n o entry from 1853 to 1856. (Hu ntington , p . 211 & p . 237 ) 
19 We tried t he dummy v ariable - interaction approach to t est 
signifi can t difference s . Th e resul t produce questionable results. 
Al t hough t h e R2 was hig her , many of t h e v ariables were 
statist ica l ly ins igni fica n t. Th i s suggests seve r e 
mul ticol linearity . 
17 
figure: bot h the PCS a nd CS i ncreased actual capital by 21%. 
This suggests t ha t t here may h ave b een more barriers to the entry 
of capital in PCS a nd t he CS . 
Regional deposi ts had no influe nce in the PCS a nd CS, whil e 
a ne gative luence i n t he rate of capital accumulation in t h e 
PFBS. When regional deposits decline by one pe rcent , the free 
banking states would initial ly increase in -state capital levels 
by . 14%, a nd in t he long - run by .27%. 20 Th i s negative effect 
indicates t hat Pure Free Banking States were more r esponsive to 
regional eco:nornic conditions . 
As expected, t h e r esults indicate t hat capital flow s i n to 
t h e banking s y s tems we r e negatively re lated to railroad returns. 
These r eturns, however , were stat i stically insignifican t for PCS 
a nd CS , whi le the y we re statistically significant for t h e PFBS . 
. An increase i n t:: h e total return to :L"ailroad stock: :r:·esul ted a 
sligh t reduction of t h e ra t e of capital accumulation, . 07% . 
Likewise, the PFBS were much more sen sitive t o changes in 
d eposits tha n the PCS and CS. In the s hort run, a one percent 
increase in deposits resulted in .57% increase i n capital in the 
PFBS , a .14% increase in PCS and an .8 % increase CS. In t he 
long run , PFBS inc r ease capi t a l by 1 . 1 6% , t h e PCS increase 
capital by .67%, a nd CS increase capi tal by .38% . This sugges ts 
th.at i n t h e l ong run banks in t he PFBS were increasing capi t al 
levels in order to maintain t heir financial leverage, but banks 
20 The l ong - r un e lasticity is calculated by dividing the 
coefficien t of each variable by the coeffic i e nt of a djustment. 
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in the PCS and CS increase their financial leverage in t he long 
run. This increase in financial leverage impl s that PCS and CS 
were able t o increase the production of loans without additional 
support from stock.holders. 
When we examine t he coeffic i ents on the failure rate , we 
find that our results cover the range o:f outcomes : the failure 
rate was negat ive and significant in PCS, and positive and 
significant in the CS and PFBS. One could explain the negative 
results in the PCS by the entry process . Perhaps, legislators in 
PCS restricted entry when bank failures occurred in t heir states 
whil e entrepreneurs in CS and PFBS were willing to enter when 
bank. failures occurred. l\.pparent ly, in PFBS and CS bank failures 
did not increase expected risk to pote n t ial entrants . 
The results in Table 3 also answer t wo key questions, did 
the PCS change their behavior after 1851 when many of the states 
enacted fre e banking laws and did the CS change their behavior 
after the e nac tment of t he free banking laws? The answers to 
t hese questions are found by examining t he coefficients on the 
TIME and FREE dummy variables. TIME 3Y a:nd TIME have t he expected 
positive sign, but they are statistical l y insignificant. Thus, 
there was n o increase in t h e trend rate of change to capital in 
the PCS in either the short - run or t he long - run. In the CS we 
f ind that there was a significant increase in t h e trend rate of 
change to capital in both the short - run and long-run; both FREE3Y 
a nd FREE are positive and stat istically significant. During the 
three year period after the e nactment of t h e free banki ng laws, 
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the rate of capital accumulation rose on average by .. 04% per 
year , a nd du ring t he e ntire period the rate of capital 
accumulation rose by .09% per year. 
In summary, the competitive model indicates that capital 
accumulation was r es tric t ive in t he Pure Chartering St.a t es .. In 
the Ch a ngeover States , the results s h owe d a "liberalization" in 
b e havior after the enactment of t he free banking laws.. After 
free banking laws are e nacted , the rate of capital accumulation 
i n creased at a faste r pace. Pure Free Banking States showed the 
greatest sensitivi t y to t h e detenninants of desired capital, a nd 
t h e largest coefficient of adjusbnent .. 
VI . Bank Ent r y Result.s 
The capital forrrBtion results s uggest that the rate of 
capital formation ma y have accelerated after 1851. If the ent:ry 
of capital was due to lower barriers to new entrants, we would 
expect that the n e t entry rate woul d have increased during the 
same period . We examine this quest ion us ing the net e ntry model 
given by equation (8) : 
NER1r, = LlnB0 + LB 1 nRR, + LB2 lnDRp + LB.,FR1, + LA1 D1,_ 1 I.lnC;, .i + FL,PERS:i t + 
BGT IME; 1 + B.,TIME3Y1'- + B.,F'REE;c + B9 FREE3Y; 1 + B10 ,,,Stat e 1 ·t E; 1 • 
Net entry i s expected to be positively related to the 
regional d e p os its, deposits, and negatively re lated to the r etu rn 
on railroad stock a nd percen tage change in ave rage capi t al size. 
Moreover, we can make infere n ces regarding t h e rrBgnitude of 
ce r tain coefficien ts . Whe n comparing r es t ctive versus non 
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restrictive bank markets , differences in the magnitude of certain 
coef ficients should be evident. For t he markets tha.t restricted 
e n t ry we would expect t hat net e ntry woul d be less responsive to 
regional depos its, deposits, and fai lure rates due t o t h e slower 
legislative process. 
The coefficient s on the dummy variables , FREE3 Y, FREE and 
TIME3Y and TIME, are expected to be posi tive. If barriers t o 
entry were reduced after t he free banking l a ws , CS s hould s h ow a 
increase in net entry after the laws were enacted . If PCS 
11 l i b era.lized n chartering polic s, TIME3Y and TIME should show an 
increase in net e nt ry after 1851 . 
The results of Net Ent ry regre s sion s are g in Table 4 . 
As exp e cted , t h e net e ntry rate increased in t h e PCS between 1852 
a nd 1854 by an a v erage of 6 . 3%. Thi s increase , however , was no t 
sus t ained for the whole period. The PCS showe d an increase of 
4 . 3% for the whole period , but t hi s result is statistically 
insign ificant . In CS states, net entry increased by an average 
of 7.3% per year during t h e firs t three y ears of free banking and 
by a 12 .8% increase per y ear for the entire p eriod of free 
b anking. I t is clear t hat the CS lowered barriers to e n try, 
while i t is u n clear t hat PCS reduced barri ers to e n try . It 
appe ars that PCS ma y have r e acted to tial c hanges i n t he 
niarket and liberalized e n try whe n many free bankins3 laws were 
enacted, but t his policy wa s not sustained throughout t h e period . 
The CS also a ppeared to b e more willing t o increase the 
number of competitors t han t h e PCS to changes in desired capital, 
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th.ough l ess will ing t han PFBS . An increase in desired capital of 
1% resu l t ed in a n increase in ne t entry of . 49 % i n PFBS, .30% in 
CS and only . 18% in PCS. The responses of PFBS a nd CS were 
quicke r than PCS. 
In l ight of t he capital formation results , the CS were just 
as slow to bring actual capital fl ows up to desired capital flows 
in t he system as PCS, but t hey were more willing to allow n e w 
entrants into t he market . Thi s s uggests that t h e PCS were 
willing to increase t h e average capital size per bank rather than 
increase the number of competitors, whereas t he CS were more 
willi ng to increase t he number of competitors wh ile maintaining 
average capital size. 
This assertion i s con firmed , in part , when we examine the 
impact of average capital size on t h e rate of net entry. We find 
that capi t al r bank had a smaller i mpac t on the net e ntry rate 
in PCS than CS. A 1% growth in capital per bank resulted in 
only a .33% decline in the net e n try rate in PCS whe r e as a 1% 
growth in capital per bank resulted in a . 74% decline in CS. 
This implies t hat in PCS bank per capita growth of 3% would 
redu ce the number of competitors by 1% wr1ereas in CS bank per 
capita growth of 1.4% would reduce the number of competitors by 
1% . Thus, it appears t h a t individual banks in t h e PCS market 
coul d grow in size wi t hout :Eorciw::J or redu cing competitors out of 
t he market, whereas the growth of individual banks in the CS 
market appeared to h ave a mu ch more significa n t impact on market 
compe t itors. 
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The other determinan ts of net e ntry led to interest i ng 
results . Regional deposits h a d little impact on t h e net entry 
rate in t wo banking markets, but we r e signif icant in the PFBS . 
These r esult s a r e similar to those found t he capital formation 
model s uggesting that out-of - state market forces were i n fluencing 
capital flows a nd b ank formation in t h e PFBS. 
All three markets responded to c h a nges i n deposits : both 
t he PCS and t h e CS s howed a .09% to .1% increase in t h e net e n try 
rate f rom a n 1% increase in d eposits, whil e PFBS showe d a .49% 
increase the net e n try rate . In t h e case of the PCS, a n increase 
i n t he fai lure rate of one percent reduced t h e net entry r ate by 
.9% whereas i n t h e CS it inc reased the net entry rate by .59% . 
It appears t hat the fail u re r ate h ad no influence on net e n try in 
t b.e PFRS . 
I n summary, it appears that bank entry act ty increased in 
both the Changeover States and Pure Chartering State during the 
enactment of t h e free banking l aws. This e n try con tinue d 
t h roughout the free banking period in the Change over States , but 
was curtailed in t h e Pure Chartering States three years after 
n e ighoring states e nacted free banki ng laws. Like wise , t he Pure 
Charte ring States h a d t h e slowest rate o f adjustmment i ndicating 
t h e most restrictive e ntry policy compared to e ither the 
cbangeovers or Pu re Free Banking States. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The e vidence s uggests t ha t s tate s e nac t ing free banking laws 
lowered barriers t o e n try as measured by t h e increases in t h e ne t 
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e n try rate and capital formation . Not surprisingly, Pure Free 
Banking States were the most r esponsive to market forces . They 
were able to accommodate changes in des ire d capital much more 
rapidly , and cesponded much more quick:l y to changes in deposits, 
t han either Pure Chartering States or Changeover States . Yet, 
even Pure Chartering States s howed a tendency to ir 1iberalize 11 
chartering policies i n i t ially during the f l urry of free banking 
laws elsewhere , though generally they continued to suppress 
entry. This liberalization of chartering policies may h ave been 
related to the increase of e n t ry a ctivity elsewhere, but this 
assertion was not tested in t hi s study and should be examined in 
the futurE.~ .. 
Changeovers States began to behave more like Pure Free 
Bank:i ng States in terms of quicker adjustment and sensitivi ty to 
mark.et forces. Ch a ngeovers appeared t o h ave 11 l iberal iz 11 entry 
of bank capital , as well as t h e number of compe titors, following 
free banking legislation. The e v idence also s h ows a tendency for 
Ch a ngeovers, and Pure Chartering States , to a llow exis t i ng banks 
to increase t h e ir financial leverage. This increased lev erage 
may expl ain why WJ d i d not find a difference in relative grow th 
rates for the v arious s tates foll owing the e nactment of t h e free 
banking laws . 
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Table 1. 
Summary of Bank Activity Prior to the Civil War 
Entr}:'. Activit}:'.a Total 
New Entry 
Three Years Prior Three Years After After FBL or 
1851 
States FBL or 1851 (%) FBL or 1851 (%) Free I Charter 
A. New England States 
Free Banking States 
Vermont (11/1851) 10 (56%) 6 (29%) 4 17 
Massachusetts (1852) 17 (16%) 18 (14%) 7 49 
Connecticut (6/1852) 15 (39%) 16 (36%) 14 26 
Weighted Average (26%) (21%) 
Charter States 
Maineb 1 (3%) 25 (78%) 39 
New Hampshire 5 (26%) 13 (59%) 30 
Rhode Island 1 (2%) 14 (22%) 21 
Weighted Average (7%) (44%) 
B. Mid-Atlantic States 
Free Banking States 
New York (4/1838) 11 (13%) 82 (84%) 418 0 
New Jersey (2/1850) 1 (4%) 23 (88%) 29 16 
Weighted Average (11%) (85%) 
Charter States 
Delawareb 4 (200%) 0 (0%) 0 6 
Maryland 5 (23%) 3 (12%) 15 
Pennsylvania 5 ( 11%) 6 (11%) 47 
Vi rgi ni ac 1 (3%) 23 (66%) 34 
Weighted Average ( 15%) (28%) 
c. Southern States 
Free Banking States 
Alabama , (2/1850) 1 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 10 
Florida (1/1853) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 2 
Georgia (12/1838) 11 (44%) 3 (8%) 2 17 
Louisiana (1853) 1 (3%) 3 (16%) 5 0 
Tennessee (2/1852) 1 (5%) 16 (73%) 22 15 
~ Weighted Average ( 18%) (30%) 
Charter States 
Kentuckyb 0 (0%) 3 (19%) 26 
North Carolina 5 (33%) 2 ( 11%) 12 
South Carolinab 0 (0%) 6 (42%) 6 
Weighted Average (12%) (23%) 
Table 1. 
Summary of Bank Activity Prior to the Civil War 
(Continue) 
Entry Activity 
Three Years Prior Three Years After 
States FBL or 1851 (%) FBL or 1851 (%) 
D. Western States 
Free Banking States 
Illinois (2/1851) 
Indiana (5/1852) 
Iowa (1858) 
Michigand (3/1837) 
Michigan (11/1858) 
Minnesota (7/1858) 
Ohi-0e (1845 & 1851) 
Wisconsin (1853) 
0 (na) 
0 (0%) 
0 (na) 
0 (na) 
0 (0%) 
0 (na) 
0 (0%) 
0 (na) 
31 (na) 
93 (664%) 
13 (na) 
40 (na) 
0 (0%) 
16 (na) 
38 (475%) 
43 (na) 
(%) Percent of banks operating prior to years of entry. 
Total New Entry 
After FBL or 1851 
Free I Charter 
141 
104 
0 
40 
1 
16 
69 
140 
0 
0 
13 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a For the year that the free banking law was eancted, entrants would be listed 
according to pre or post enactment. 
b Total number represents total net entrants which is calculated by subtracting the 
highest total number of banks operating in the period from the number of banks 
operating in 1851. 
c Virginia is technically a charter state although chartering policy was no different 
than a free banking state. 
d Michigan enacted the first free banking law in March of 1837. The influx of new 
entrants and the gross mismangement of the owners forced the legislature to repeal 
the law in April, 1838. The number of charters represents the minimum number of 
banks that were issued prior to the enactment of the second free banking law. 
e Total entrants include banks that entered under the limited free banking and the 
free banking law. 
Primary Sources: State Bank Condition Reports found in state reports, U.S. 
Congressional Documents and Banker's Magazine. Comptroller of Currency Report 1876. 
Secondary Sources: Connecticut, William F. Hasse, A History of Money and Banking in 
Connecticut (New Haven, 1957); New Jersey, William H. Dillistin, Directory of New 
Jersey Banks 1804 - 1942 (Trenton, 1942); Tennessee, C. A. Campbell, The Development 
of Banking in Tennessee (Nashville, 1932); Alabama, Albert Moore, History of Alabama 
(University, Ala. 1935) 
Table 2 
Sample of states 
Period of 
State Chartering Free Banking 
Alabama 1844 - 1849 1850 - 1860 
Connecticut8 1844 - 1851 1852 - 1855 
1856 - 1860 
Delaware 1844 - 1860 
Georgia 1844 - 1860 
Kentucky 1844 - 1860 
Illinois 1853 - 1860 
Indiana 1844 - 1852 1853 - 1860 
Louisiana 1844 - 1852 1853 - 1860 
Maine 1844 - 1860 
Maryland 1844 - 1860 
Massachusetts 1844 - 1851 1852 - 1860 
New Hampshire 1844 - 1860 
New Jersey 1844 - 1850 1851 - 1860 
New York 1844 - 1860 
North Carolina 1844 - 1860 
Ohiob 1844 1845 - 1860 
Pennsylvania 1844 - 1860 
Rhode Island 1844 - 1860 
Tennessee8 1844 - 1851 1852 - 1857 
1858 - 1860 
Vermont 1844 - 1851 1852 - 1860 
Virginia 1844 - 1860 
Wisconsin 1853 - 1860 
a Theses states repealed there free banking laws. 
b Ohio enacted a limited free entry law in 1845 and the standard 
free banking law in 1852. Between 1853-1856, there was de 
facto no entry. 
Table 3 
Capital Formation Model 
Dependent: l'llnC 
Pure Charters a Changeovers a Pure Free 
1 2 1 2 
LN REGIONAL DEP 0.041 0.042 0.009 -0.011 - 0 .135 
( 0. 865) ( 0. 890) ( 0. 350) ( - . 464) (-2.41)** 
LN RR 
-0.013 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.067 
(-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.60) (-1.47) (-1.77)*** 
LN LAG CAPITAL -0.191 -0.212 -0.132 -0.208 - 0.493 
(-4.97)* (-6.12)* (-4.49)* (-6.90)* (-5.05)* 
LN DEPOSITS 0.148 0.141 0.100 0.078 0.572 
( 4. 18) * ( 3. 52) * ( 3. 53) * ( 2. 79) * (4. 77) * 
FAILURE RATE -0.362 -0.358 0.361 0.323 1.336 
( 1 . 8 2) *** ( -1 . 7 8) *** ( 4. 08) * ( 4. 08) * ( 2 . 2 2) ** 
TIME3Y 0. 013 
(0. 761) 
TIME 0.016 
( 0. 631) 
FREE3Y 0.041 
(2 . 19)** 
FREE 0.094 
( 4. 39) * 
R2 
.31 .31 .34 .43 .63 
Sample Size 140 149 29 
Chow Test F - Statistic: 4.57 
*, **, *** denote significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively . 
a Heteroscedasticity was found in these samples. State dummies were used in these 
samples to capture fixed affects and were omitted from the table. 
Table 4 
Net Entry Model 
Dependent: Net Entry Rate 
Pure Charters Changeovers a Pure Free 
1 2 a 1 2 
LN REGIONAL DEP 0.012 0. 013 -0.005 -0.037 - 0.101 
(0.642) (0.288) (- .149) ( - . 979) (-1.74)*** 
LN RR 0.018 0.097 -0.105 -0.010 -0.428 
(0.322) ( 1.12) (-. 687) (-. 070) (0.986) 
LN LAG CAPITAL 
-0.030 -0.178 -0.190 -0.294 - 0.494 
(-1.85)*** (-4.95) * (-3.83)* (-5.60)* (-4.25)* 
LN DEPOSITS 0.025 0.090 0.119 0.100 0 .494 
( 1. 34) ( 2.09)** ( 2. 93). ( 2.45)** ( 3. 33). 
FAILURE RATE -1.04 -0.892 0.637 0.594 - 0.745 
(-4.65)* (-3.94)* (3. 64). ( 3. 50). ( - . 986) 
% 11 CAP PER BANK -.255 -0.325 -0. 710 - 0.738 0.178 
(-4.00)* (-5.01)* (7. 94). (-8.32)* ( 0. 661) 
TIME3Y 0.063 
( 4. 02). 
TIME 0.043 
( 1. 55) 
FREE3Y 0.073 
(2.45)** 
FREE 0.128 
( 3. 6 9). 
R2 
.32 .37 .39 .42 .71 
Sample Size 140 147 29 
Chow Test F-Statistic: 4.57 
*, **, *** denote significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
a Heteroscedasticity was found in these samples. State dummies were used in these 
samples to capture fixed affects and were omitted from the table. 
